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Anaximander of Miletus is one of the greatest thinkers of all times. A towering figure that opened 
the way to the vast Western naturalistic scientific and philosophical developments of the last two 
and a half millennia. The significance of his legacy, long underestimated, is increasingly 
recognised by historians with scientific sensibility, as one of the deep historical roots of modern 
science.  Daniel Graham writes “Anaximander’s project proved in the hands of his successors a 
program capable of endless development and, in the light of its modern incarnations, productive 
of the greatest advances in knowledge the world has ever known. In a sense, his private project 
has become the grand quest for knowledge of the world.”  Dirk Couprie calls Anaximander “on a 
par with Newton”.  In the introduction to the essay collection `Anaximander in Context’, the 
editors write “We are convinced that Anaximander was one of the greatest minds that had ever 
lived, and we felt that this had not been sufficiently reflected in the scholarship, until now.” Karl 
Popper salutes Anaximander’s realisation that the sky is not just above us, but continues also below 
us —pictorially: Earth floats suspended over the void— as “one of the boldest, most revolutionary 
and most portentous ideas in the whole history of human thought”. 
 
But Anaximander is also an shadowy figure. We have a badly incomplete and fragmentary 
picture of his thinking, based on a single cryptic fragment and sparse references to his ideas in 
texts written centuries after him. Some of these ideas shine like diamonds through this mist, for 
their astonishing novelty and the profound influence they have clearly had over the entire 
Western though; but the overall conceptual cadre in which they were framed is unclear, and open 
to different readings.  Any renewed effort to bring Anaximander’s thought into focus is therefore 
precious, and Gregory’s learned and detailed `re-assessment’ is much welcome. 
 
Gregory’s work is particularly praiseworthy where he analyses in detail the numerous open 
questions of interpretation of Anaximander’s ideas. He makes an excellent good job comparing 
the divergent opinions in the literature and criticising those that do not hold; I find his instinct 
and judgment mostly reliable. He is particularly convincing when he criticises theological or non-
naturalistic interpretations of Anaximander. I have appreciated many details, for instance his 
pointing out the issue of the stability of the wheels of the heavenly bodies, or his sensibility in 
realising that some issues (such as where are the limits of the cosmos) might well not have been a 
concern for Anaximander. There is a lot to learn on Anaximander from this book. 
 
When `assessing’ an ancient author, two perspectives can be taken; the difference is especially 
relevant in this case. The first is the specialist who struggles to reconstruct all views of an author 
as closely as possible as they were expressed at the time. The second is the wider perspective of 
studying the role played by a thinker in the net of the concatenation of the ideas: what is novel, 
how novel, and its influence. The second perspective cannot do without the first, but the first 
alone risks to get lost in details of marginal significance and be blind to what turns out to become 
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influential. I have written a book on Anaximander from the second perspective, focused on the 
influence that he (or the Milesians in general) have had on the development of science. Gregory's 
work, on the contrary, is within the first: a vast source of valuable scholarly information. 
 
There are issues where I find Gregory’s account less convincing. A thesis of the book is that 
Anaximander’s explanation of natural phenomena are biological rather than mechanical.  
Gregory  uses terms like “organic” and “irreducibly biological”. The problem I see is that these 
are terms of a debate that is two centuries old, and has no meaning today, nor —I suspect— at 
Anaximander’s time. The existence of a radical mechanical/biological divide, and the issue of the 
reducibility of one side to the other, are not anymore relevant in today’s science (life is just one of 
the natural phenomena and complexity is not unique to it), and were most likely not relevant in 
the VI century BCE either. It is a XIX century’s issue, part of the outdated debate on the 
mechanical philosophy; it seems to reflects specific intellectual concerns by Gregory more than a 
distinction useful for understanding Anaximander. Anaximander’s nature is what it is, and 
Anaximander has a very unitary notion of it, as Gregory himself nicely points out; he uses 
analogies of both kinds, without distinction; to discuss Anaximander in terms of the largely 
artificial mechanical/biological distinction seems to me to obscure matters rather than shed light.  
 
A key related issue is the importance that Gregory attributes to the notion of “steering”. The 
claim is that the apeiron—the “entity” that Anaximander puts as the `principle’ of everything— 
“steers”, or “governs” natural phenomena.  I find the evidence weak: a single verb used by 
Aristotle, while the notion is never repeated by any of the numerous ancient authors that talk 
about Anaximander.  I do not see `steering’ to fit in the naturalism universally attributed to 
Anaximander. Gregory talks explicitly of “pantheism”, “intelligence”, “intentionality” and even, 
insistently, of “the modern theory of intelligent design” (sic). Intentionality requires somebody to 
have an intention, and what Anaximander is universally recognised for having achieved seems to 
me precisely the opposite: glimpsed and practiced a way of thinking healed from this 
anthropomorphism. More importantly, we do know quite a consistent number of tentative 
explanations of natural phenomena by Anaximander: definitely none of these refers to any 
`steering’.  What is interesting in these explanations is precisely the complete lack reference to 
reference to intentionality in them.  
 
But Gregory has a point he cares to defend: he comes back over and over again in the book on 
the relation between science and religion, to argue against the idea of a conflict between the two.  
He states the thesis —arguably questionable— that the notion of a conflict between science and 
religion is an “old model”.  He insists in interpreting the apeiron as something “divine”, dismissing 
with nonchalance all contrary arguments, such as the very explicit testimony of a definite expert: 
Saint Augustin: “…nor did he [Anaximander] attribute anything to a divine mind in the 
production of all activities of things” (City of God VIII, 2). And Augustin was trying hard to find 
the divine in ancient authors.  I am not convinced by Gregory’s effort of bring the divine, 
intentionality, and intelligent design into the apeiron.  
 
To be sure, Gregory agrees that Anaximander’s major historical merit is his naturalism.  He 
agrees that the greatest merit of Anaximander is to have sought natural explanations for all 
phenomena, where the intervention and caprice of the gods plays no role. He acutely notices, in 
particular, that the most interesting part of Anaximander’s naturalism is the treatment of human 
beings on par with other animals: the origin of human beings is accounted for as part of the 
natural order with entirely natural origin. There is no sense of a special relation to the gods for 
humans, either in terms of their origin or their lives.  He also agrees that the apeiron is part of 
nature, not something extra-natural.    
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But he seems to be himself disconcerted by this radical naturalism. At the end of Chapter 8, after 
having described the structure of Anaximander’s cosmos, he (Gregory, not Anaximander) 
exclaims:  “Could a cosmos which exhibit such taxis (order), such specific placement and 
structure, come about by chance or by unguided physical/mechanical processes?”  Seems to me 
that that this is Gregory’s argument for the `steering’: he is simply rejecting the profound intuition 
of Anaximander’s naturalism, on which so much of the later development of our civilisation will 
be built: nature does not need somebody or something to stir it.  Equivalently: `being steered’, is 
no explanation at all.  It is just setting up a mysterious hypothetical agent, to whom to delegate 
what we do not understand.  
 
Of course, evidence about Anaximander’s detailed ideas is so weak that the missing dots in the 
reconstruction of his thinking can be filled in different manners.  But here is where perhaps a 
larger historical perspective can have value, over the concentration on details. If we take a wider 
perspective, we can detect the historical novelty of a school of thought from its legacy.  And here 
the evidence is overwhelming, because the cleavage between before and after the Milesian 
thinkers is unequivocal, almost dramatic, and it is specifically to Anaximander that ancient 
authors attribute most of it, even when they take their distances from it, as for the naturalistic 
interpretation of the meteorological phenomena, considered obvious today but mostly rejected in 
antiquity.  What has emerged around Anaximander is what the Greeks called Περὶ φύσεων 
ἱστορία, (hence “Physics”), the “inquiry into nature”, one the deep roots of modernity: the 
creation of a tradition that would form the basis for the entirety of the scientific evolution to 
come: Greek, Indian, Arab, European and today planetary. Event the literary form of this 
tradition, a treaty in prose, starts with Anaximander.  Milesian is the first rational view of the 
natural order. For the first time, the world of things and their relations is seen as directly 
accessible by the investigation of thought, without a passage by the divine. Anaximander opens 
the way to geography. To biology, contemplating the possibility that living beings had evolved 
over time. To astronomy, making a rational study of the movements of heavenly bodies and 
seeking to reproduce them with a geometrical model. He is the first to propose two conceptual 
tools that would prove fundamental to scientific activity: the idea of natural laws that describe the 
unfolding of events over time and by necessity; and the use of theoretical terms to postulate new 
entities, hypostases needed to make sense of the observable world. He founds the critical tradition 
that forms the basis of today’s scientific thinking: he follows his master’s path, while at the same 
time searching his master’s mistakes. 
 
Most importantly, he realises the first great conceptual revolution in the history of science: the 
universality of falling (all heavy things fall down along up-down parallel lines) is questioned, and a 
new image of the world is proposed, where space is not structured in up and down, and the Earth 
`floats free’ in space. For the first time, the overall map of the world is redrawn in depth. It is the 
discovery of the world view that will characterise the West for many centuries, the birth of 
cosmology and the first great scientific revolution. Even more, it is the discovery that scientific 
revolutions are possible at all: in order for us to understand the world, we must be aware that our 
world view may be mistaken and we can redraw it. This is the key feature of scientific thinking. 
What seems most obvious to us about the world (everything unsupported falls) can be false (the 
Earth does not fall).  Scientific thinking is a continuous quest for novel ways for conceptualising 
the world. Knowledge is born from a respectful but radical act of rebellion against what we 
currently think.  This is the richest heritage that the West has bequeathed to today’s global 
culture, its finest contribution. But it is also an act of rebellion, a challenge launched by Thales 
and Anaximander: freeing humanity’s understanding of the world from the mythical-religious 
matrix that had structured thought for thousands of years; considering the possibility that the 
world is understandable without recourse to divinity, intentionality, intelligent design, or 
mysterious `steering’. This is a new prospect for humanity—one that, twenty-six centuries later, 
still frightens the majority of women and men on this little planet floating in space. 
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Of all this, little is recognisable in Gregory. On the contrary, the book has frequent polemics 
against  any scientific reading of Anaximander. Gregory for instance criticises the connection 
between Anaximander and modern evolution theory with a detailed and punctilious list of 
differences between modern evolution theory and Anaximander, concluding “Clearly 
Anaximander has some sense of the development of life on earth but wether that ought be though 
as a theory if evolution is another matter”; as if a thinker of two and half millennium ago could 
have guessed the entire modern evolutionary theory.  What Gregory fails to see, in my opinion, is 
that modern evolutionary theory is not born out of nothing: it grew influenced by older ideas, it 
has roots, and key ones are in Empedocles and Anaximander, as Darwin states explicitly in his 
book.  Another polemic in the book is against the use of expressions such as “The First Scientist”, 
which —I am afraid— was chosen by my American publisher as the English title my own book 
on Anaximander.  Gregory’s polemic is that Anaximander is not the only thinker that could be so 
named: a triviality, of course, and a misinterpretation a simple colourful expression.  There is 
similar polemic against the use of “float” or “suspended in the void” to picture the novelty of 
Anaximander’s idea that the sky continues below the Earth. Gregory punctiliously remarks that 
there is nothing to “float” upon and nothing to be “suspended” to.  As if those employing this 
metaphorical language (Karl Popper, for instance) wouldn't know.  
 
I think that Gregory genuinely does not appreciate the radical novelty and the historical 
relevance of the steps taken by Anaximander. He is not the first on this, and the reason is the 
pernicious modern separation between sciences and humanities. The long underrating of Greek 
science, which is fortunately beginning to change today, was simply due to the fact that most 
scientists are not interested in history and most historians are not interested in science. 
Consequences could reach the grotesque: one still finds in the literature the claim that Ptolemy 
did not know trigonometry because he did not use Sin and Cos (he uses Cord, which is twice the Sin 
of half the angle). So much of the ancient Greek reflection is closer to science than any other 
modern activity, and the lack of scientific sensitivity makes the best historians blind to what is 
actually going on. Sometimes they sounds like a deaf man explaining Beethoven.  
 
Gregory is definitely not a scientist: in discussing Anaximander’s earthquakes he considers 
plausible that Anaximander could have predicted an earthquake, and suggest that he may have 
done so on watching the winds, which is a nonsense.  He lists fragments where Anaximander 
attributes meteorological phenomenon to the action of the sun on the particles of air and 
humidity, and comments that “we do not explain meteorological phenomena in this way today”.  
Of course we do.   In the conclusion, he writes that he offers a picture of Anaximander “with 
fewer superficial similarities to modern scientific theories”. This precisely misses the point of the 
Milesian’s relevance for science: what is relevant is not the superficial similarity to modern 
scientific theories: what is relevant is the beginning of a radically new way of posing questions and 
seeking answers. This, via a long path, has lead to modern scientific theories. By not seeing all 
this, Gregory ends up filling the missing dots with hypothetical archaic aspects of Anaximander 
thinking, rather than emphasising the aspects that have had historical significance. The risk of this 
specialist approach is to pass next to diamonds without noticing them. One example for all: the 
realisation that Earth floats over the void —the “boldest and most portentous ideas in the the 
whole history of human thought” according to Popper— is barely mentioned by Gregory.   
 
Gregory’s book is precious, and I will keep going back to it when I have doubts about details of 
Anaximander’s thinking. But I think it does not contain the essential. At the beginning of the 
Prologue, Gregory tells a little story regarding Bayes theorem. It is a joke and not particularly 
important, but it contains a revealing detail. Gregory writes that he found that “nothing is so dull 
and so tedious” as Bayes theorem, and that a colleagues of him that fell asleep during a talk on 
the theorem had the “proper philosophical response to Bayes' theorem”.  Bayes theorem has 
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since become the foundation of modern confirmation theory, it plays a central role in the 
contemporary philosophy of science, and once its full significance is understood, it is amazing for 
its beauty, simplicity and depth. But you need a scientific sensibility to grasp its reach. You need 
scientific sensibility to see what Anaximander, a giant, has achieved.  
 
 
Andrew Gregory  
“Anaximander a re-assessment” 
Bloomsbury 2016, 293 pages. 
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